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 ‘ At the European Union we have a seat at the table with big countries and we also have a microphone. But we must 
be careful about how others around the table will react 
before we speak’A small country ambassador to the European Union 
 ‘ Τhere are two kinds of European countries: those that are small and know it and those that are small and don’t’A Belgian Prime Minister
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Most European Union members are small states, lacking the hard resources 
of states with a big national economy or army. To advance their goals in an 
EU setting, small states must rely on smart power. This involves identifying 
issues of national concern early in the policymaking process; endorsing 
consensus positions early in the process of policy deliberation; and build-
ing alliances with countries with likeminded policy positions. 
I. The EU is divided into 6 big states and 21 median size and smaller 
states. Portugal’s population is 13 percent above the median EU country; 
its aggregate Gross Domestic Product is almost 90 percent below that of 
the four biggest members and its GDP per capita is 19 percent below the 
EU median. 
* Collectively, small states can prevent any single big state from dominat-
ing the EU. 
* However, each small state is at risk of being lost in a crowd of small 
states.
II. The policies of the European Union must reflect common interests of 
two dozen states. Portugal’s representatives in Brussels and the government 
in Lisbon must coordinate the preparation of positions that are acceptable 
both in Lisbon and in Brussels. 
* Portugal needs to emphasise common interests that include the coun-
try’s specific priorities rather than distinctive national interests. 
* Endorsement of policies in the Council requires a super-majority of 
255 of its 345 votes and Portugal has 12 votes. EU decisions are usually 
arrived at by lengthy negotiations leading to a consensus. Policies are 
arrived at by a process of bargaining. As long as policy goals are shared, 
Portugal’s small number of votes is not a handicap. 
* To influence policy, Portugal must join coalitions with more than a 
dozen other member states, large and small. 
* A consensus is produced by EU committee discussions involving 
national civil servants and Commission officials. Once the chair of a 
committee declares a consensus has been reached, it is very difficult for 
a small country to challenge this judgment. Government ministers only 
become involved if there are grounds for political disagreement.
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* A well staffed Permanent Representative’s Office in Brussels is needed to 
formulate Portugal’s position on an issue at early stages of a discussion 
in order to avoid having to accept a fait accompli. 
III. The European Parliament is divided by party rather than by national-
ity. Portugal’s 22 MEPs are divided between the two largest multi-national 
Party Groups, the European People’s Party and the Socialist Group, and 
the small United-Left/Nordic Green Group. Decisions in the EP normally 
require endorsement by a coalition of the People’s Party and Socialist 
Groups. 
* Politically able MEPs can leverage their influence by earning important 
posts in their multi-national Party Group. 
* EP decisions are usually taken by discussions in committees, Party 
Groups or negotiations with the European Commission. It takes time 
for individuals to learn how the complex multi-national EU system 
works. Portugal has a high turnover of MEPs: more than two-thirds of 
its MEPs elected in 2009 had not been members of the previous EP. 
* High turnover of MEPs is a consequence of individual and party deci-
sions more than the result of shifts in the popular vote.
IV. Budget policy reflects different formulas for raising and spending 
revenue. National contributions to the EU budget are determined by a 
formula based on national income, while EU spending is determined by 
formulas based on the need for economic and rural development and agri-
culture. Portugal receives more than twice as much money from the EU as 
it contributes. 
* EU expansion to Eastern Europe and the Balkans increases the number 
of countries with stronger economic claims on EU funds than Portugal. 
CONCLUSION:
Key requirements to exercise smart power include: 
* Actively seeking more ties with governments and public officials in 
Northern Europe and in Eastern Europe. 
* Nominating EP candidates who are prepared to spend two terms in the 
EP rather than leaving soon after learning to do their job there. 
* Mobilizing popular understanding of the constraints and opportunities 
that EU membership places on national government.
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INTRODUCTION:PARADOXES OF 
RELATIVE SIZE
Small states join international organizations in order to deal with problems 
collectively that they cannot deal with effectively on their own. This is true 
of the European Union as it is of the United Nations. If being a big state 
means having the power to impose political decisions on other countries, 
then no member of the 27 - country EU is big, for none can determine EU 
policies on its own. However, states that have more resources find it easier 
to make their views known when they speak and to attract allies necessary 
to arrive at EU decisions. In a Union of half a billion people, small countries 
have fewer resources and must develop smart power in order to make their 
voices heard and be part of the coalitions that make EU policy. 
In relations between countries, absolute measures of size are less mean-
ingful than relative measures. In global terms France or Germany is small 
compared to China but in an EU setting each is large compared to Portugal. 
Historically, big states could act without paying attention to concerns of 
small states and small states were decision-takers with little or no influence 
on big decisions. A political definition of a small state is that it is the weak 
partner in its relations with other states (Steinmetz and Wivel, 2010: 6f). 
In the past, small states sought to protect themselves from domination by 
keeping out of the way of bigger states, as Portugal did during the Second 
World War. 
The experience of war and economic incentives have encouraged smaller 
states to prefer being a junior partner in league with big states in intergov-
ernmental institutions that make common policies to advance common 
goals. The European Union originated in intergovernmental treaties signed 
by three relatively large states, France, Germany and Italy, and three small 
states, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. By contrast with NATO, 
which places small states behind the military shield of a superpower, EU 
treaties confer equal legal status on all member states. Every country has a 
veto on policies of exceptional importance and every country is subject to 
the judgment of the European Court of Justice. Such constraints can cause 
problems for a big country that has been accustomed to thinking of itself as 
a great power. Small states do not have that problem, because their policies 
have always had to take into account the influence of big states. By impos-
ing obligations of membership on big as well as small states, the latter enjoy 
protection that they would be unable to achieve on their own. Moreover, 
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entitlement to EU funds is not determined by a country’s size but by the 
social and economic characteristics that justify entitlement to EU money. 
The European Union does not get rid of differences of national resources, 
but it has institutions in which bargaining is the norm. When represen-
tatives of 27 member states meet in Brussels, none is large enough to 
dominate all the others and EU rules result in policies emerging from 
joint discussions among big, medium-size and small EU member states. 
However, although small states have more votes than a strict population-
based allocation would justify, in total the EU’s most populous states have 
far more votes in the European Council and European Parliament than 
have representatives of states the size of Portugal or smaller. Since Portugal 
has been a member of the European Union for a quarter of a century, its 
public officials have had time to gain experience in working the EU system. 
The 11 smaller countries that joined the EU in 2004 or afterwards have not 
had so much experience. 
The purpose of this Report is to explain how and when size matters for 
Portugal in the European Union’s two key co-decisionmaking institutions, 
the EU’s Councils and the European Parliament (EP). The prime minister 
represents Portugal in the European Council, which defines the general 
political direction and priorities of the European Union. In the Council 
(formerly the Council of Ministers), Portugal is represented by the Cabinet 
minister whose department is responsible for the policy under discussion. 
Although Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are nationally 
elected, they vote in accord with the whip of multi-national Party Groups; 
thus, the MEPs that Portuguese divide their votes among three different 
Party Groups. In both institutions, each big state has more votes while each 
small state has disproportionately more votes in relation to their population 
The hard resources of states tend to be fixed, and this is especially true for 
money and military force, both influenced by the size of a country’s popu-
lation. Large countries can use such hard power to persuade other coun-
tries to agree with their position. However, size is no guarantee of success. 
The recurring difficulties of Italy’s political economy illustrate this. The 
inability of Britain to get its way in the European Union, even though it is 
one of the largest member states, shows that the hard power that goes with 
population size and a large aggregate GDP is insufficient to determine EU 
policies. Moreover, EU policies are not arrived at by what Churchill called 
‘war, war’; they are arrived at by ‘jaw, jaw’, that is, lengthy deliberations. 
Because smaller countries lack hard power, they must compensate for 
their lack of hard resources by developing smart power, that is, alertness 
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in identifying issues of national concern and consensus positions; techni-
cal knowledge of how an EU proposal will affect their country; and politi-
cal skill in networking and building coalitions that will support policies of 
mutual interest. Smart power involves adopting a national position that is 
close enough to that held by a sufficient number of other countries so that 
it can be incorporated in whatever decision emerges from the EU policy 
process. Smart power may also be used to neutralize proposals deemed 
objectionable to a country. Without the exercise of smart power, small EU 
member states are simply spectators when others arrive at agreements. 
While all small states would like to punch above their weight in EU delib-
erations, they are not equally adept in doing so. Countries similar in popu-
lation differ in the uses made of their resources. If a small country has the 
officials and population accustomed to dealing with individuals and insti-
tutions across national boundaries, this can compensate for low popula-
tion. Switzerland is an outstanding example of a country that has a big 
displacement in the international economy even though its population is 
less than that of Portugal. The multi-national character of every EU meet-
ing gives national representatives opportunities to build cross-national 
networks--provided they are used to this end rather than simply to re-iterate 
what is said in their national capital. 
This paper is organised using a conceptual methodology of David Easton 
(1965) that distinguishes between policy inputs, the processing of inputs, 
and the outputs of public policy. Inputs to the EU’s co-decision process 
come from national governments participating in the work of the European 
Council and from national electorates choosing national parties to repre-
sent them in the European Parliament. The institutions that process inputs 
from national, multi-national and trans-national sources--the Council and 
the Parliament--are bound by rules requiring majorities or super-majorities 
to form coalitions in which small states as well as big states are included. 
In both institutions, big states have more votes but the great majority of 
decisions are arrived at by consensus agreements in which votes are not 
cast but the shadow of votes can exert influence. The typical outputs of 
the co-decision process are laws, regulations and directives that are equally 
applicable to every member state, whatever its size, and have a major 
economic impact, for example, measures about the single Europe market. 
The money that the EU actually transfers to member states is allocated to 
social cohesion, regional development, and related programmes according 
to formulas that take into account economic needs. 
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Because a country’s position in the European Union is relative to that of 
other countries, comparison is necessary to evaluate the resources that 
Portugal can make use of to exercise smart power. Therefore, the following 
pages contain tables that explicitly compare Portugal with the EU’s other 
26 member states, so that readers can see not only how small Portugal is 
compared to countries such as France or Germany, but also how it compares 
with prosperous and not so prosperous countries that are similar to it or 
smaller in population. 
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TAKING PORTUGAL’S MEASURE
In a Union of 27 countries, only one country can be at the 
very top of any ranking and one at the very bottom of any 
ranking; every other country is somewhere in between. 
Small states cannot expect to be at the top but do not want to 
be near the bottom. Portugal’s relative size can be calculated 
by assigning the median EU country a score of 100 for a 
given value and dividing that of Portugal by the value of the 
median country. To be above the median a country requires 
a score greater than 100; a score less than 100 indicates the 
extent to which it is below the median. 
In population, the European Union is an association of a few 
relatively big states and a large number of states that are not 
big, including some that are very small, such as Luxembourg 
and Malta. Each of the four biggest member states, Germany, 
France, Britain and Italy, has more than 60mn people, Spain 
has a population of 46mn and Poland, 38mn. Even though 
Portugal’s population is not on this scale, it is nonetheless 
among the more populous EU member states; its population 
of 10.6mn population is 13 percent more than that of the 
median EU member, Sweden. Portugal’s standing is due to 
almost one-third of EU member states having populations 
that are less than half that of Portugal (Table 1.1). 
The size of a national economy is measured by its Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP); aggregate GDP reflects both its 
economic achievements and its population. Thus, a country 
such as Spain has an aggregate Gross Domestic Product that 
is much larger than that of Sweden, because Spain’s popula-
tion is much larger. Because it is not so big in population, 
Portugal’s aggregate GDP is inevitably small compared to 
the EU’s large member states. Because it has not been as 
economically developed as some old and smaller members, 
Portugal’s GDP is less than half that of Belgium and Sweden. 
However, because Central and East European economies 
still show the effects of decades of Communist control, 
Portugal has the median total Gross Domestic Product 
in the EU system and it is more than double that of nine 
member states.
I
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Table 1.1 Absolute and relative measures of hard resources
  Population  
,000
Pop’n
index
GDP/ 
ctry  
bns €
GDP/
ctry 
index
GDP/ 
cap 
pps €
GDP/ 
cap 
index
Germany 81,751 868 2,476.8 1435 28,800 119
France 65,075 691 1,932.8 1120 26,300 109
UK 62,435 663 1,706.3 989 27,400 113
Italy 60,626 644 1,556.0 902 24,600 102
Spain 46,152 490 1,051.3 609 24,500 101
Poland 38,200  406 354.3 205 15,300 63
Romania 21,413 227 124.1 72 11,400 47
Netherlands 16,654 177 588.4 341 32,500 134
Greece 11,329 120 227.3 132 21,900 90
Belgium 10,918 116 354.4 205 29,000 120
PORTUGAL 10,636 113 172.6 100 19,500 81
Czech Rep 10,532 112 149.3 87 19,400 80
Hungary 9,986 106 97.1 56 15,800 65
Sweden 9,415 100 346.5 201 30,100 124
Austria 8,355 89 286.2 166 30,800 127
Bulgaria 7,504 80 36.0 21 10,700 44
Denmark 5,560 59 235.6 137 31,000 128
Slovakia 5,435 58 65.9 38 18,000 74
Finland 5,375  57 180.3 104 28,200 117
Ireland 4,480 48 155.9 90 31,100 129
Lithuania 3,244  34 27.5 16 14,000 58
Latvia 2,229 24 17.9 10 12,500 52
Slovenia 2,050 22 35.4 21 20,700 86
Estonia  1,340  14 14.3 8 15,700 65
Cyprus 804 9 17.3 10 24,200 100
Luxembourg 511 5 40.2 23 66,300 274
Malta 417 4 6.1 4 20,200 83
Indexes calculated as each country’s absolute value divided by the absolute 
value of the median EU country and multiplied by 100.
Sources: Population as 1 January 2011. Source: Eurostat;
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&language=en&pcod
e=tps00001&tableSelection=1&footnotes=yes&labeling=labels&plugin=1 
HOW SIZE MATTERS: PORTUGAL AS AN EU MEMBER 15
GDP per country in current EUR 2010 Source: Eurostat,
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=table&plugi
n=1&pcode=tec00001&language=en
GDP per capita Purchasing Power Standard 2010. Source: Eurostat, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&languag
e=en&pcode=tec00001 
Correlation between GDP/ctry (table 1.1.) and contributes to EU budget 
(table 4.1) is .965 sig. .000.
The prosperity of a country’s citizens is measured by divid-
ing its aggregate Gross Domestic Product by its population; 
this shows its GDP per capita. Doing so corrects for the effect 
that a large population can have on the national economy of 
a relatively poor country.1 For example, Poland is a country 
that has more than four times the population of Portugal 
and double the aggregate GDP, but a per capita income that 
is a third less than that of Portugal. Portugal’s GDP per 
capita places it below the median country, but still higher 
than that of nine Central and East European countries. 
When European Union member countries are compared, 
Portugal is neither specially big nor specially small. Because 
the population of the EU is skewed with a few big countries 
and many quite small ones, Portugal’s 10.8mn population 
places it in the middle along with Austria and Belgium 
among older member states, and the Czech Republic and 
Hungary among newer member states. Even though 
Portugal’s economy is less developed than most of the older 
EU members, the enlargement of the EU has placed its GDP 
in aggregate and per capita in the middle third of states.
Change over time. Portugal’s governors, like all that joined 
the European Union after it was launched in 1957, had to 
learn how to cope with this new level of governance. When 
Portugal joined in 1986, the EU was small; it had only ten 
member states and it shared with Spain the experience of 
membership being the final stage in the consolidation of 
democracy after a period of undemocratic rule. Unlike 
Spain, where Franco had authorized an opening to Europe 
in anticipation of the inevitable transition to a post-Franco 
1. The correlation between national population and GDP per capita is an 
insignificant, 0.03, and the same is true for the correlation between 
total GDP and per capita GDP, 0.16. 
When European Union 
member countries are 
compared, Portugal is 
neither specially big nor 
specially small
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regime, Portugal had not. In Salazar’s words, ‘We are 
proudly alone’ (Magone, 2000: 141). Since then, Portugal has 
had more than a quarter of a century’s experience of being 
part of a multi-level system of governance.
Although the EU only had 12 member states after Portugal’s 
entry, five had national populations up to five times that 
of Portugal. Hence, the country’s population was only 3.0 
percent that of the EU total (Figure 1.1). The European 
Union has more than doubled in membership since Portugal 
joined. It increased to 15 member states in 1995 with the 
admission of Austria, Finland and Sweden. Subsequent 
enlargements have brought the number of member states 
up to 27 (with Croatia due to become the 28th member in 
2013) and increasing population to 500 million people. Since 
the population of Portugal has remained relatively constant, it 
now has barely just 2 percent of the EU’s total EU population. 
Figure 1.1 Portugal’s Changing size in the EU
Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL
Portugal has barely just 
2 percent of the EU’s 
total EU population
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Enlargement has substantially altered the scale and compo-
sition of the EU’s deliberations. As a member of a much 
smaller EU, Portugal’s representatives were not lost in a 
large array of small states. Today, instead of a dozen or two 
people meeting around a table, a large room is required to 
accommodate 27 national representatives plus EU staff and 
advisers. This rations the time and attention that can be 
given to any state, especially one of the 19 small states that 
are now present at EU meetings. When Portugal joined, it 
could expect to help set the agenda by holding the rotating 
Presidency of the European Council once every seven or 
eight years. There will now be at least a 14-year gap between 
the most recent Portuguese presidency and the next possible 
opening in 2021. 
When Portugal joined the EU, national economies were 
much more national. The Single Europe Market was just 
being launched and the euro was an idea. The Single Market 
has created a steady stream of European Commission meas-
ures that affect the increasingly Europeanized economies of 
every member state. Without prompting by national repre-
sentatives, the Commission may take into account all the 
relevant conditions of each of 27 member states, especially 
smaller states. In a complementary manner, the growing 
scope and penetration of EU policies in the past quarter-
century has Europeanized significant areas of domestic 
policymaking. The increase in ‘Euromestic issues’, that is, 
those subject to action by both the EU and national govern-
ments, has increased the burden on member states to track 
what Brussels is doing when making its national policy.
In geopolitical terms, the admission of ten new member 
states from Central and Eastern Europe has placed Germany 
in a central position. The admission of two Mediterranean 
states, Cyprus and Malta, has also brought the EU closer to 
Turkey and North Africa. Atlantic nations such as Portugal 
are now challenged to make sure that this development does 
not result in a re-orientation of EU policies to the east. The 
Northern Europe/Southern Europe division between pros-
perous economies and less prosperous economies claiming 
EU economic assistance has been challenged by a division 
between ten countries of Eastern Europe and the market 
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economies of Western Europe. Nine post-Communist 
countries can cite a standard of living lower than Portugal 
to justify EU assistance (see Table 1.1). 
Common characteristics of small states. Although small 
states differ in many ways, they often share politically signif-
icant characteristics. Small states tend to have fewer priority 
issues than large states and their claims on the EU budget 
are small in absolute terms compared to states the size of 
Poland or France. However, because small states are numer-
ous, the cost of disbursing euros for economic development 
to a dozen or more states below the EU median is, in total, a 
lot more than doing so when the EU had less than half as 
many members. 
The legal framework of the EU as a treaty between states 
gives every small state juridical equality. Every state has the 
right to be present in Council committees deliberating on 
EU policies. The consensus culture of the EU, affirmed in 
Article 15 of the Treaty of the European Union, creates an 
expectation that before decisions are taken, efforts will be 
made to accommodate concerns of small states, provided 
that a small state is realistic in what it seeks and does not 
make claims counter to the key position of the majority. 
In extreme cases, a small state can even wield a veto, as 
the Republic of Cyprus has done in the course of the EU’s 
negotiations about the admission of Turkey. However, small 
states, like large, prefer to avoid a veto because it may make 
it more difficult to secure allies on other issues. 
Small states have tended to support strong supra-national 
institutions, because procedures laid down in treaties tend 
to treat all states as formally equal. Thus, when the EU 
delegates discretion in applying laws, small states prefer 
this power to go to the European Commission, whose 
multi-national staff is expected to act in accord with proce-
dural rules vesting rights in small states rather than giving 
discretion to the European Council, where the interests of 
big states have more weight (Schure and Verdun, 2008). By 
contrast, big states tend to prefer bargaining in informal 
meetings between the heads of a few states, whether a global 
G-7 or a bilateral meeting between the German Chancellor 
Small states tend to have 
fewer priority issues than 
large states and their 
claims on the EU budget 
are small
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and the President of France. When enlargement called into 
question the practice of having at least one citizen of each 
member state as a member of the European Commission, 
small states joined together to reject this proposal (Slapin, 
2011: 111ff).
Insofar as a smaller country has fewer policy priorities, this 
can make it uncommitted on issues that specially concern 
big states, such as foreign and security policy. A conse-
quence of neutrality is that the Presidency of the European 
Commission tends to rotate between the former prime 
minister of a small state, since 2004 Jose Manuel Barroso of 
Portugal, and a leading politician of a big state, such as Jacques 
Delors, rather than rotate just among big states. When the 
first standing President of the European Council was chosen, 
the big states preferred a former Belgian prime minister as 
head rather than the former prime minister of a big state. 
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MAKING A SMALL STATE’S 
VOICE HEARD IN THE POLICY 
PROCESS
Whereas international diplomacy can be conducted by a 
few large states or super-powers and decisions presented to 
small countries on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, the EU decision 
process requires big states to take into account the views of 
small states before a decision can be reached. However, EU 
enlargement has meant there is less time for each coun-
try to make its voice heard at EU meetings. Each country 
must compete with 26 other national representatives with 
opinions about a draft policy. A smaller country needs to 
use smart power to monitor deliberations and then decide 
whether there is a consensus in its favour or what it may do 
to try to remove unsatisfactory parts
The ability of states to be heard within the European 
Council varies with the importance of an issue. ‘Big’ politi-
cal issues--what to do about a financial crisis or how to 
combine the free movement of Europeans and national 
concerns about immigration or terrorism--are the excep-
tion. The great majority of laws, regulations and directives 
that are the object of deliberation are ‘little’, affecting a very 
narrow sector of the economy, a low status government 
department, relatively few people or a limited number of 
countries or lack of partisan salience. They do not require 
the attention of national prime ministers meeting in the 
European Council. Most measures are handled in discus-
sions among national civil servants, Commission officials 
and experts meeting in groups in which the quality of a 
participant’s contribution counts for more than the popu-
lation of a speaker’s state. Whereas senior politicians tend 
to dismiss technical measures as of little or no importance, 
founders of the EU such as Jean Monnet saw the gradual and 
steady accumulation of a large number of little measures as 
promoting progress toward an ever closer Union. Hence, 
even if their minister is not personally concerned, officials 
II
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in national ministries need to keep a watching brief on the 
steady flow of measures coming from the Commission.
Processing lots of little and a few big policies. The European 
Commission is chiefly responsible for formulating propos-
als for EU action. The stimulus to draft policies on big 
issues can come from the European Council. On lesser 
issues it reflects the feedback the Commission receives from 
administering existing policies, pressures from external 
groups and its own expert assessments and consultations. 
The Commission is staffed by individuals who, regardless 
of their nationality, are expected to act independently of 
their country of origin. The Commissioner who heads each 
Directorate is nominated by a member state, but is expected 
to promote common EU goals. The current President of 
the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, does not 
represent Portugal in Brussels but the European Union to 
all of its member states. Having a fellow national in the 
Commission can provide useful background understanding 
of policies. It nonetheless remains up to each member state 
to speak for itself in the EC process. 
Proposals from the Commission are scrutinized by 
COREPER, the Committee of Permanent Representatives 
of each member state. Its membership consists of ambassa-
dor-level heads of the Office of Permanent Representative 
(PERMREP) of each member state. The first responsibil-
ity of COREPER is to divide proposals into big measures 
that raise issues of concern to national politicians and 
little ones deemed ‘not political enough’ to merit the atten-
tion of busy ministers. Three-quarters or more of policies 
formally requiring the approval of the Council are classified 
as not of sufficient political significance to require the atten-
tion of ministers. They are handled by discussions within 
COREPER and its working parties (Nugent, 2010: 152).
Smart power is needed to evaluate Commission proposals 
because the expansion of the EU’s activities has been 
combined with procedural changes that reduce the time 
taken for its hundreds of recommendations to be translated 
into binding policies. A greater volume of faster (or at least, 
less slow moving) legislation increases pressure on 
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PERMREP officials from smaller states, because they need 
to state their national position on a policy at the earliest 
stages of its evolution. If a small state’s position is only 
voiced after the main outlines of a proposal have been 
accepted, it is very difficult for it to undo it, whereas big 
states have sufficient political clout to do so. 
Monitoring policy proposals requires a large and well quali-
fied Permanent Representative’s staff to network with coun-
terparts from other member states, Commission staff and 
their national ministries. Having a mix of diplomats and 
officials from domestic departments much affected by EU 
policies, for example, ministries of trade and commerce, 
agriculture and finance, facilitates drawing on national 
ministry in Lisbon for advice on technical details and poten-
tial political problems. The PERMREP Office of Portugal 
has more than 50 senior professionals. The PERMREP’s 
Office is very large by the standard of Portugal’s embassies 
in other countries and reflects the importance of EU policies 
for national government policy. It is larger than that of many 
small states and, after taking into account population, large 
relative to a big country such as the United Kingdom. 
Before a proposal can be approved it is subject to discussion 
in Brussels by supra-national civil servants of the European 
Commission and civil servants of member states. Officials 
monitor the great volume of materials that are part of the 
process of formulating policies; they seek guidance about 
what the government would like an EU decision to be; and 
they decide which measures require political attention by 
ministers meeting in the European Council and which 
measures they can decide themselves. 
Measures classified as of little political significance it none-
theless receives scrutiny by PERMREP civil servants to see 
how provisions drafted by a multi-national Commission 
interact with their own national laws, a necessary condi-
tion for its implementation. They also look to see whether a 
measure deemed apolitical in Brussels could stir up political 
trouble at home. Civil servants carrying out these tasks tend 
to share a framework for evaluating policies and to prefer 
compromise to conflict. Moreover, they are expected to 
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resolve measures assigned them without creating disputes 
that require ministerial attention. This is the only way to 
avoid overloading the crowded agenda of the Council so that 
senior politicians have time to deal with big issues that are 
national priorities. 
Each PERMREP’s Office has a wide variety of activities that 
it can undertake in efforts to make an EU policy consistent 
with national priorities. Negotiating activities include seek-
ing information and lobbying the Commission and relevant 
members of the European Parliament, marshalling expert 
opinions about the framing and problem-solving effective-
ness of a proposal, and networking with other small states 
in order to join or build coalitions. To gain the backing of a 
group, national officials try to cast national preferences in 
the form of general statements about what is deemed desir-
able for most or all member states. 
The extent to which PERMREPs differ in their activities has 
been evaluated by Diana Panke (2011), who has created an 
Index of Negotiating Activity from data collected by inter-
viewing PERMREP officials from member states. On the 
Negotiating Index, which has a theoretical range of 0 to 100, 
the highest score was credited to Britain, 72, and the lowest 
to Cyprus, 36. Portugal is the median country in negotiating 
activity, with an Index rating of 48. When scores are broken 
down by subject matter, Portugal is a little above the median 
on both agricultural and environmental issues, and in 2009 
it was slightly below average on economic issues. Statistical 
analysis finds that the longer a state has been an EU member, 
the more able it is in promoting national priorities in multi-
national deliberations. Thus, the Negotiating Activity Index 
for all six founder states is higher than that of Portugal, 
which joined the EU 19 years later, while that of all 12 states 
joining since 2004 is lower. 
For the minority of issues that are politically ‘hot’, the 
Permanent Representative’s responsibility is to identify 
positions that a national minister could put forward with 
a likelihood of being incorporated in a compromise agreed 
with ministers from 26 other states. Each member state is 
represented at the Council by the Cabinet minister whose 
Portugal is the median 
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department is most responsible for issues on the agenda, 
for example, proposals affecting transport, agriculture, 
employment, or consumer protection. It is the minister’s job 
to influence discussions there so that an EU policy is agreed 
consistent with the government’s interest. 
Arriving at Council decisions. When proposals get the atten-
tion of leading politicians in the Council2, each member state 
has a voice, but because votes there tend to reflect popula-
tion, their voices are not equal. However, Council prac-
tice is to avoid drawing a sharp line between winners and 
losers as in British-style adversary politics. Instead, priority 
is given to decisionmaking by discussions and bargaining 
that produce a consensus in which all or almost all member 
states can find enough advantages in a proposal to give it 
support. The great majority of Council decisions are taken 
without votes being recorded for and against. 
The decision rules of the Council encourage consensus 
because they set a high standard for approval. When the 
European Community was launched, the adoption of poli-
cies required the unanimous consent of all six member 
states. However, the capacity to threaten a veto was scaled 
down before Portugal joined the European Union. Today, 
unanimity in the European Council applies to a limited 
number of major actions, such as the approval of a treaty, 
decisions about the admission of new member states, 
foreign and security issues and taxation. The threat of a veto 
is rarely invoked, especially by small countries. In the words 
of a Luxembourg official, ‘We can say No only once every 
ten years’.
The distribution of the 345 Council votes has some regard to 
population, but the exact number of votes assigned to each 
country is not calculated by a precise mathematical calcula-
tion. It reflects past political bargains arrived at between big 
and small states. 
2. The term Council is used to cover meetings of prime ministers and the 
more numerous meetings of national Cabinet ministers in the Council 
of Ministers. 
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* Four countries--Britain, France, Germany and Italy-
-each have 29 votes, 8.4 percent of the total vote in the 
Council. Collectively, the four biggest countries have 
one-third of the total Council vote, and 45 percent of the 
super majority vote required by QMV rules.
* Two countries--Spain and Poland--each has 27 votes, 
only two votes less than the big four countries, even 
though their population is significantly less. Each has 7.8 
percent of the total vote of the Council and 11 percent of 
the super majority required by QMV rules. 
* Romania and the Netherlands have 14 and 13 votes 
respectively in recognition of their above-average share 
of the EU population. Each country’s vote is 4 percent of 
the Council total. 
* PORTUGAL is one of five countries having 12 Council 
votes, 3.5 percent of the total and 4.9 percent of what is 
required for a super majority vote. The other countries 
with 12 votes are Belgium, the Czech Republic, Greece 
and Hungary.
* Austria, Bulgaria and Sweden each have 10 Council 
votes, 2.9 percent of the total vote and 4 percent of what is 
required for a super majority.
* Five states--Denmark, Ireland, Finland, Lithuania and 
Slovakia--each have 7 votes, 2 percent of the Council 
total. 
* Four votes are given to each of five countries--Cyprus, 
Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg and Slovenia--and Malta 
has 3 votes. The six countries in total have fewer votes 
than each of the six biggest states.
Smaller countries have more Council votes than they would 
receive if votes were distributed to all countries in propor-
tion to their population. Portugal receives one Council vote 
for every 886,000 people, whereas Spain has almost twice as 
many people for each Council vote and Germany more than 
four times as many. However, differences in population are 
so great between the biggest countries and other member 
states that Spain has more than double the Council votes of 
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Portugal and Germany even more. There is a strong correla-
tion between a country’s total votes and population; after 
controlling for the base allocation of six seats, on average a 
country receives one more Council vote for each additional 
2.7mn citizens.3 
Enlargement of the EU has had the paradoxical effect 
of increasing Portugal’s absolute number of votes in the 
European Council while decreasing its relative share. When 
Portugal was one of 12 member states, it had 5 votes in a 
Council of 76. It now has 12 in Council with 345 votes. 
Portugal’s share of the total vote has thus declined from 5.7 
percent to 3.5 percent. This does not alter Portugal’s posi-
tion as a country with a limited number of votes to add to 
a coalition, but the big increase in the number of national 
governments participating in Council meetings creates a lot 
more competition for to be heard among small countries. 
Qualified Majority Voting rules require a triple majority. 
First of all, 255 votes for the approval of a measure, that is 
73.9 percent of the Council’s total of 345 votes. At a mini-
mum, to achieve this total would require approval by 13 
member states: all four of the biggest state, four more states 
above average in population, plus five states with 12 votes 
each, of which Portugal is one. But this would be insufficient, 
because a second requirement is that a Commission proposal 
will only pass if it also endorsed by an absolute majority of 
member states or a two-thirds majority if a proposal is initi-
ated within the Council. A third requirement is that states 
endorsing a measure should collectively have at least 62 
percent of the population of the EU. These rules result in 
a combination of larger and smaller states being required 
to secure Council approval. The rules also stipulate that a 
Council proposal will be rejected if 91 votes are cast against 
it. If the four largest states were against a measure, this 
would be sufficient to block a proposal. However, a proposal 
would be unlikely to be put on the Council agenda if there 
3. In a least squares regression, with a correlation of 0.95, the unstan-
dardized coefficient of 0.37 represents just over a third of a Council 
vote for every additional 1 million persons. 
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was clear opposition from most big states or a large number 
of smaller states. 
The weight of big states will be increased by a clause in the 
Lisbon Treaty that lowers the size of the super-majority from 
November, 2014. The new rules still require a double major-
ity. A total of 55 percent of votes must endorse a proposal, a 
total that the eight largest states could provide. In addition, 
65 percent of the EU’s population must endorse a proposal, a 
criterion that could be met by the six largest states. A block-
ing minority must include at least four states, a criterion that 
could be met if Germany, plus two other big states and one 
small state joined together in opposition. For Portugal, the 
situation remains as before: it will need to be in a coalition of 
big and small states in order to be in the majority when the 
Council endorses a policy. 
Mathematicians such as Penrose, Banzhaf, and Shapley 
and Shubik have devised a variety of power indexes of the 
likelihood of an individual player being able to change an 
outcome by casting the deciding vote when votes are not 
distributed equally (for reviews relevant to the EU, see Barr 
and Passarelli, 2009; Felsenthal and Machover, 2009). The 
probability can range from 0 to 100. However, the distri-
bution of votes between countries and the requirement 
of multiple super majorities limits the probability of even 
the largest country, Germany, being decisive. Moreover, 
because 27 countries vote, the mathematicians’ index of 
power is a complex cooperative game. It thus differs from 
Robert Dahl’s (1967: 203) classic definition of power as the 
probability of one actor being able to get another to do what 
the former wants even if the latter does not. Dahl’s bilateral 
definition of power is familiar to small states with big neigh-
bours, such as Austria and Ireland. It is a major reason why 
they value the EU’s grant of procedural rights for participa-
tion in multilateral EU deliberations.
A country’s votes can be influential in three different ways-
-its overall power, being decisive in forming a majority, 
or in blocking the adoption of a measure. Felsenthal and 
Machover (2009) calculate Power Indexes for each crite-
rion and do so not only for the current rules but also for 
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the reduction in the size of the super-majorities as from 
November 2014. 
The power of Portugal can be evaluated by comparison with 
Germany, with a population more than seven times larger; 
Spain, more than four times more populous; and Ireland, 
with less than half the population of Portugal. Currently, 
the overall Power Index of Germany and Spain are each 
double that of Portugal, while Ireland is two-fifths less. 
There is a similar relationship for majority and blocking 
votes. Changes in voting rules in 2014 will give more weight 
to population. This will make the overall Power Index for 
Germany four times that of Portugal and Spain will increase 
both absolutely and relatively. Portugal’s overall index will 
continue to remain large compared to Ireland. The capacity 
to form a blocking minority is lowered in 2014 for all coun-
tries but not equally. The blocking index of Portugal is more 
than halved while that of Spain and Ireland drop by just over 
a third, and Germany is only slightly affected. 
Table 2.1 Power indexes of european council votes
Overall Majority Blocking
2011 2015 2011 2015 2011 2015
(Maximum Index range .00 to 1.00)
Germany .032 .193 7.78 11.31 .806 .757
Spain .031 .121 7.41 7.10 .767 .475
PORTUGAL .015 .048 3.68 2.81 .381 .188
Ireland .009 .036 2.18 2.12 .226 .142
Source: See Felsenthal and Machover (2009) Appendix Tables 1, 2, 3 and 
text for full mathematical exposition of each index.
Like any summary index, mathematical measures of power 
do not take into account major characteristics of the EU 
process of arriving at decisions. First of all, a big major-
ity of measures that the EU adopts are not discussed by 
the Council; they are reviewed by COREPER in a process 
that emphasizes discussion by public officials and experts, 
including participants from Portugal’s Office of Permanent 
Representative. 
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When measures do have a political content, national minis-
ters then engage in discussions in which those who repre-
sent states with more voting power, as shown above, have a 
bigger voice. Few issues coming before the Council involve 
zero-sum issues, in which what some countries gain other 
countries must lose. Most EU proposals consist of a variety 
of elements that can be amended without rejection of their 
overall intent. Details can be made more widely acceptable 
by adding a clause, a sentence or a phrase, or removing a 
line or a few lines to which objection is taken. If a number 
of countries fear a loss, they can use the threat of voting as 
a blocking minority to force the removal of a measure from 
the Council’s agenda for an indefinite period. This proce-
dure is favoured by smaller countries that lack the votes to 
reject a proposal on principle. If one or two countries cannot 
have their views accommodated, they may be granted opt 
outs, the fall back negotiating strategy of Britain. However, 
doing so can create a reputation for being uncooperative 
and thus harm negotiations on unrelated issues. 
Whereas a big state with a position out of harmony with 
majority opinion cannot be ignored, small states run the 
risk of have their preferences ignored if they are not ready to 
compromise, because their omission from a consensus of 20 
or more states is normally viewed as of no consequence. 
Small states must adopt positions in harmony with coun-
tries with more influence in determining a policy consen-
sus. Being in harmony does not require a government to say 
the same as a big state, but to ensure that whatever is distinc-
tive in its position can fit within whatever compromise is 
likely to emerge as an EU policy. Even better are circum-
stances in which the Portuguese position is aligned with 
that of big states such as Germany or shared with a number 
of states that can take a group initiative on behalf of propos-
als that take into account concerns specific to Portugal. 
Of the hundreds of measures that come before the Council 
each year, an overwhelming majority are approved by 
unanimous consent. In the pre-enlargement period 2000-
2004, an average of 85 percent were so confirmed and 
only 15 percent were subject to Qualified Majority Voting 
(Diedrichs and Wessels, 2006: 227). Subsequent to enlarge-
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ment, more than 90 percent or more of measures have been 
approved unanimously. When recorded votes are called, it 
is often at the behest of one or a few countries that want to 
cast a symbolic negative vote or make a statement that plays 
to their domestic political audience but does not create an 
obstacle to Council approval (Hagemann, 2010). 
Because most Council decisions are arrived at by bargain-
ing in which states the size of Portugal cannot be deci-
sive, a realistic strategy is to be part of a winning alliance. 
Making a case for amending a policy on grounds of collec-
tive benefits, saying ‘We would like this’, is more likely to 
attract agreement than voicing a claim by saying, ‘My coun-
try wants this’. Because small countries have fewer votes 
to contribute to a coalition, they have greater incentives 
to adopt ‘agreeable’ policies and, when voicing a view, to 
make sure they are in harmony with a substantial number 
of countries. Stating a national position that is popular in 
the national media or parliament but unpopular in an EU 
conclave invites isolation. 
When issues first appear on the EU agenda, national 
representatives of small states must think in terms of ‘pre-
compromising’, that is, articulating positions that have been 
adjusted to take into account what may be acceptable to 
other national governments. In this way Portugal can hope 
to get some satisfaction from a measure that the Council is 
certain to approve and remove clauses that may be objec-
tionable. By putting forward amendments and objections 
early in the deliberation process and accepting the domi-
nance of big states when the biggest disputes arise, Portugal 
avoids being on the losing side. A review of Council deci-
sions since 2004 found that Portugal casts a negative vote or 
abstains on just over 2 percent of issues coming before the 
Council (Mattila, 2010: 30). 
The extent to which Portuguese policymakers achieve satis-
faction on politically controversial issues has been evalu-
ated statistically by Arregui and Thomson on the basis of 
interviews with PERMREP officials (2009). Satisfaction is 
measured as the extent to which an EU decision reflected a 
country’s initial position in the process that led up to it. On 
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average EU decisions resulted in most countries being more 
or less satisfied with the relation between their initial goal 
and what the outcome was; the spread of countries around 
the median position is limited (Arregui and Thomson, 2009: 
Figure 2). Consistent with the EU’s culture of accommoda-
tion and compromise, no country was totally satisfied or 
dissatisfied. 
Portuguese officials had the median satisfaction rating in 
the pre-enlargement 15-nation Union. They tended to be 
more satisfied than big countries such as France and Italy; 
this may reflect the fact that bigger countries have more 
ambitious goals. However, the fact that the three Nordic 
countries and Ireland recorded even more satisfaction 
suggests that these countries have more smart power. After 
enlargement, the match between what Portugal sought and 
what the EU decided remained virtually the same. The rela-
tively high degree of satisfaction found in Portugal suggests 
that officials are realistic in what they can achieve and 
prepared to ‘pre-adjust’ their positions in order to state pref-
erences consistent with what they expect will attract allies 
in the process of the bargaining that leads to a decision by 
consensus. 
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REPRESENTATION IN THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
The European Parliament is a forum in which MEPs and 
parties can voice the views of their voters and an institution 
with co-decision rights with the Council on major policy 
proposals. In addition, it has power over the EU’s budget, 
the confirmation of persons nominated by member states 
as Commissioners; and it can vote no confidence in it. The 
work load of the EP is great. In the first half of the current 
Parliament it has approved an average of just over 400 pieces 
of legislation and non-legislative measures a year. It also 
engages in continuing discussions about a large volume of 
suggested policy actions. 
Up to a point, size is important in enabling a country’s MEPs 
to represent the diversity of opinions in a country’s elec-
torate. For that reason, each country has had a minimum 
number of MEPs4, and they must be elected by proportional 
representation. Thus, even though the Portuguese Socialist 
Party could no longer represent the country in the European 
Council when it lost the election last year, it retained a voice 
in the European Parliament. Since the views of voters are 
represented by parties, it is not necessary to have a lot of 
MEPs voicing the same party line in a debate. Only half 
an hour is set aside in each monthly session for individual 
MEPs to make one-minute statements. Nor is there patience 
for a multi-national Parliament to listen to 96 Germans or 
72 Italians making statements about matters before it. As a 
rough rule of thumb, if a country has 20 or more MEPs, and 
Portugal has 22, then it has enough to have one representa-
tive on each EP committee that reviews policies.
Within the European Parliament, MEPs are organized by 
multi-national Party Groups and vote on party rather than 
national lines. When the Parliament votes, it is the size of 
multi-national Party Groups that is critical in determining 
whether there is the absolute majority necessary to approve 
of a proposal. Since EP rules require a Party Group to have 
4. The minimum is increased to six by the Lisbon Treaty.
III
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members from a minimum of seven states, no country can 
dominate a Group that is influential in the work of the 
Parliament. When Party Groups disagree, then Portuguese 
MEPs will cast their ballots in opposition to each other, just 
as they would in the national Parliament. 
Portugal’s share of MEPs. The Lisbon Treaty states contra-
dictory positions about representation. Article 9 declares: 
‘In all its activities, the Union shall observe the principle 
of equality of its citizens, who shall receive equal attention 
from its institutions, bodies, offices and agencies’. However, 
article 14 requires that MEPs shall be allocated to member 
states by a process of degressive proportionality. The size of 
a country’s population thus becomes a critical determinant 
of how many MEPs it has, but the relationship is dispropor-
tional. Instead of each MEP representing approximately the 
same number of citizens in accord with each vote having 
the same value, MEPs from a less populous member state 
represent fewer citizens than MEPs from a state that has a 
larger population.5 In addition, the Lisbon Treaty benefits the 
smallest member states by prescribing that every state should 
have at least six MEPs and no state more than 96 MEPs. 
Because the distribution of population among EU coun-
tries is skewed, 19 member states including Portugal benefit 
significantly from the EU system of allocating MEPs (Figure 
3.1). If the same population quota were applied to every EU 
country, then Portugal would have 16 rather than 22 MEPs. 
Degressive proportionality results in over-representation 
increasing as population falls. Portugal’s number of MEPs 
is greater than that of 13 member states, while the benefit 
it receives from the EU’s system of disproportional repre-
sentation is much less. The quota needed to claim an MEP 
in Malta or Luxembourg is one-sixth that of Portugal. 
Portugal also has far fewer MEPs than the EU’s four biggest 
countries, led by Germany with 96 MEPs.
The dynamics of enlargement have reduced both the abso-
lute and the relative size of Portugal’s membership in the 
5. The upper chamber in Parliaments of federal states are similar in not 
representing citizens equally but, unlike the unicameral European 
Parliament, their departure from equality is counter-balanced by the 
equal representation of all citizens in the lower chamber. See Rose (2012). 
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European Parliament. Initially it had 24 MEPs in an EP with 
518 members and in 1994 it returned 25 MEPs to a Parliament 
of 567 members. Following the EP’s 2004 enlargement, 
Portugal lost one seat, and in 2009 it lost two seats. The allo-
cation of seats in the Parliament to be elected in 2014 is now 
under review. A report commissioned by the Constitutional 
Affairs Committee of the Parliament has produced a math-
ematical formula for re-allocating seats consistent with the 
constraints of the Lisbon Treaty (Grimmett et al., 2011: Table 
1). The net effect would be to give more MEPs to larger states 
in order to reduce the under-representation of their citizens. 
Since the number of MEPs of the smallest states cannot be 
reduced, seats must be taken from medium-size countries. 
Thus, the Report proposes reducing Portugal’s representa-
tion by 4 MEPs to 18 and similar reductions in the seats of 
other medium size countries. Even if the Report is rejected 
by a coalition of small states (cf. Rose et al., 2012), the admis-
sion of Croatia will require the subtraction of 11 EP seats 
from existing member countries, again making Portugal 
vulnerable to having its representation reduced.
Figure 3.1 Unequal Allocation of MEPs by Country
Source: Calculated by dividing the population per MEP in each country by 
the population per MEP in the whole EU and multiplying the result by 100. 
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Reductions in Portugal’s share of seats in the European 
Parliament have not altered the two fundamental char-
acteristics of Portugal’s position. It benefits from the EP’s 
commitment to the over-representation of less populous 
member states but its MEPs will always constitute only a few 
percent of the Parliament’s total membership. 
Choices of parties and voters. While the European Union 
sets rules about how many MEPs represent a country, 
Portuguese voters determine which parties represent them 
and the parties choose the candidates in winning posi-
tions on their list. Strictly speaking, MEPs represent those 
who turn out to vote. In 2009 turnout in Portugal was only 
36.8 percent, 7 percentage points below that for the whole 
of Europe. Empirical research indicates that the party pref-
erences of non-voters in EP elections differ very little from 
those of voters (see Bernhagen and Rose, 2011). 
Although MEPs are elected to sit in multi-national Party 
Groups, in each country voters choose between national 
party candidates and tend to favour the same party they 
vote for at national elections. At the 2009 EP election, five 
Portuguese parties won seats. The then Opposition in the 
national Parliament, the Social Democratic Party, took 8 
seats and the Popular Party won 2 seats, while then govern-
ing party, the Socialists, won 7 seats. The Left Bloc gained 
3 seats and the Communist Party won 2 MEPs. Although 
no party achieved a double-digit number of MEPs, each of 
Portugal’s two largest parties has more MEPs than four EU 
member states. 
Whereas Portugal’s parties and voters propose which 
Portuguese politicians become Members of the European 
Parliament, multi-national Party Groups and alliances 
decide what the Parliament does. The outcome of an EP elec-
tion produces a Parliament with MEPs elected as nominees 
of up to 170 different national parties. The median national 
party winning seats has two MEPs and the number of MEPs 
in even the largest national parties falls hundreds short of 
providing an absolute majority. Hence, there is a need for 
trans-national organisation and, since every party has won 
its seats by competing against other national parties, organ-
ization is on lines of trans-national partisan principles, 
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whether of socialists, liberals, greens or people’s parties. In 
the 2009 European Parliament, MEPs have formed seven 
multi-national Party Groups plus a small residual group of 
the non-aligned. 
The two main Portuguese parties affiliate to the two larg-
est EP Groups. Portuguese Social Democrats are 10 among 
the 265 members of the European People’s Party Group and 
the Socialists are 7 of the 184 members of the Socialist & 
Democratic Group. This guarantees their MEPs access to 
Group leaders who can exercise substantial influence on 
collective decisions of the Parliament. If an MEP partici-
pates effectively in a large Party Group, he or she can lever-
age their influence. However, by belonging to a large Party 
Group which can include French, Germans, British or 
Italian MEPs, Portuguese MEPs are no more than eighth 
in their national number in the People’s Group and in the 
Socialist Group. 
The affiliation of Portugal’s largest parties with the two larg-
est groups in the European Parliament ensures that whatever 
the partisan outcome of an election, the country’s repre-
sentatives will have a place in the Groups that dominate the 
work of the Parliament. By contrast, the affiliation of more 
than one-fifth of Portugal’s MEPs with one of the smallest 
EP Groups, the nominally United Left-Nordic Green Group, 
makes it more difficult for these MEPs to exert influence on 
collective decisions of 
the Parliament. The absence of any Portuguese representa-
tion in the Liberal Group, the third largest in the Parliament, 
is a handicap as it can sometimes be decisive in constituting 
an EP majority. In the European Parliament, Portugal lacks 
members in five Party Groups with a total of 255 MEPs. 
The limited number of Group affiliations of Portugal is not 
the result of size, for countries with fewer MEPs, such as 
Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania and Sweden 
affiliate to five or six Party Groups, and a majority of coun-
tries have MEPs in all three of the big Party Groups. 
The European Parliament usually makes its decisions by a 
voice vote rather than by a ballot that records the position of 
individual MEPs and Party Groups. Since no Party Group 
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has ever come close to having an absolute majority of the 751 
members of the European Parliament, consensus endorse-
ment requires an alliance of Party Groups. Political arith-
metic dictates two choices, a black/red majority between the 
European People’s Party and the Socialist Party, or an anti-
Socialist coalition of Groups with very disparate outlooks 
(Hix et al., 2007; Rose and Borz, 2011: 23ff). A black/red 
coalition is more than sufficient to ensure endorsement of a 
measure without a recorded vote; it is normal in recorded 
votes too. Consensus voting means that Portuguese MEPs 
who have competed against each other nationally often vote 
on the same side. It also means that when a black/red coali-
tion is difficult to construct and the Liberal Group is pivotal, 
Portugal is not represented there. 
Figure 3.2 Portuguese Parties in EP Party Groups
Source: Distribution of MEPs following the June, 2009 election. All others 
include ALDE, 84; Green-EFA, 55, European Conservative and Reform, 54, 
European Freedom & Democracy 32, and non-aligned.
Social Democratic and Socialist MEPs are normally on the 
winning side when a recorded vote is held in the European 
Parliament. In the 2004-09 Parliament, the EPP was on the 
winning side in 86 percent of votes and the Socialists in 81 
percent of votes. By contrast, the third Group with which 
Portuguese MEPs normally affiliated, the Left Greens, was 
only on the winning side in 52 percent of votes. The pattern 
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HOW SIZE MATTERS: PORTUGAL AS AN EU MEMBER38
has been much the same in the first years of the Parliament 
elected in 2009 (Corbett et al., 2011: 124; www.votewatch.eu). 
Combining partisan and national representation. Because 
the European Parliament has even more members than the 
biggest national parliament of any member state, the orga-
nization of influence is concentrated in the hands of the 
limited number of MEPs holding leading posts in its Bureau, 
in Party Groups, and in Committees of the Parliament. 
These posts are distributed among MEPs of many nationali-
ties. Size matters: since the number of important EP posts to 
be distributed is few, most smaller countries will receive few 
if any senior posts. No Portuguese has ever been President 
of the European Parliament; no Portuguese is currently one 
of the 14 Vice Presidents with oversight of policy areas; and 
no Portuguese is currently one of the 5 Questors concerned 
with the administration of the Parliament. In addition, no 
Portuguese MEP has ever been president of any of the EP’s 
three largest Party Groups, the People’s Party, the Socialists 
and the Liberals. A Portuguese MEP has only twice been a 
minor party president, the Greens, 1989-90, and the United 
Left-Nordic Greens, 1993-94. 
Because of the volume and diversity of topics coming before 
the Parliament, the great bulk of the EP’s work is done in 
committees that review Commission proposals and negoti-
ate with the Council about resolving differences of opinion 
so that a proposal can be recommended for approval by the 
full Parliament. The EP has 20 different standing commit-
tees and can establish committees ad hoc to deal with 
important topical issues, such as the current financial crisis. 
Each committee has a chair and three vice chairs. Every 
country can expect to have at least one official post, but since 
they are determined by bargaining between Party Groups 
nationality is secondary to partisanship. At the beginning of 
the 2009 parliament there was one Portuguese chair at the 
International Trade Committee. In previous parliaments 
with fewer member states, there were Portuguese chairs of 
committees for Development, 1999-2004; Civil Liberties and 
Justice, 1994-1997; and Employment and Social Affairs, 1987-
1989. In the current Parliament, Portuguese MEPs have been 
vice chairs of committees of Employment and Social Affairs; 
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Women’s Rights and Gender Equality; and the Special 
Committee on Financial, Economic and Social Crisis. 
MEPs are assigned to committees on the basis of agreement 
between the leaders of Party Groups. They agree assign-
ments more or less in proportion to each Group’s size and 
with regard to representing nationalities. Small states are 
less handicapped by size in the work of committees, because 
the most popular committees are large and there is an 
expectation that smaller countries will have more than one 
member in order for the views of a country’s different parties 
to be expressed. Thus, notwithstanding an eight to one 
difference in population between Germany and Portugal, 
the ratio of their MEPs on the Budget committee is less than 
half that. On the much smaller Fisheries Committee, which 
deals with policies of importance to Portugal, it has two 
members, only one less than Germany. In addition, every 
committee allows substitutes with most of the rights of full 
committee members. It is thus possible to have up to three 
Portuguese MEPs on committees of special national impor-
tance. Whatever the partisan control of government in 
Lisbon, on each EP Committee there is almost certain to be 
an MEP of the government party and of the Opposition.
Within a committee, brokers representing the major Party 
Groups have a key role in appointing co-ordinators to repre-
sent the Group’s position there. Each co-ordinator can keep 
before the committee the key points that will determine 
whether their Group will support a proposal. The co-ordi-
nators of the largest parties can negotiate terms that, if 
adopted, will assure a majority within the Committee and, 
most likely, endorsement by the full parliament. Because 
Portugal is only represented in three Party Groups, its MEPs 
are less likely to play a part in the co-ordination of commit-
tee positions. Being in a small Party Group can handicap 
MEPs from a big country too; this has been the experience 
of British Conservative MEPs since they moved from the 
EPP to the small Freedom and Democracy Party Group. 
For each issue coming before it, a Committee appoints a 
rapporteur to prepare a dossier that evaluates the proposal 
in depth, clarifies the major points on which a consensus is 
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identifiable, and where differences will need to be compro-
mised to gain majority endorsement. The appointment of an 
MEP as a rapporteur is a sign of respect for their judgment 
by multi-national and multi-party committees. Portuguese 
MEPs have been well above average in their activity as 
committee rapporteurs (Figure 3.3). In the 2004-2009 
Parliament they collectively ranked seventh, just behind 
MEPs from big countries with twice to four times as many 
MEPs. Portuguese MEPs were also more active in this role 
than MEPs from similar size or larger older member states, 
such as the Netherlands, Austria and Belgium, as well as 
from smaller older or new member states. 
Figure 3.3 Committee Rapporteurs on EP Policies by Country
Portuguese MEPs have 
been well above average 
in their activity as 
committee rapporteurs
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*Countries with less than 10 reports: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Romania, Slovakia. Total: 
37 Reports.
Source: Reports for the Sixth Parliament, 2004-2009, as reported in Hix and 
Boyland (2011: 58).
Because the activities of the European Parliament are rela-
tively distant from ordinary citizens and decisions must 
be reached through multi-national deliberations, ordinary 
citizens cannot expect their MEPs to act as agents carry-
ing out programmes that have been endorsed nationally. 
Instead, MEPs should act as trustees for the interests of their 
voters, using their discretion to do what they think best in 
an EU context. Eurobarometer surveys regularly monitor 
the extent to which citizens actually do trust the European 
Parliament. In its autumn, 2011 poll, 41 percent of European 
respondents expressed trust in the European Parliament, 
45 percent did not, and the remainder had no view. The 
distribution of opinion in Portugal was almost the same: 
44 percent expressed trust in the European Parliament and 
an equal percentage tended not to trust it. However, a strik-
ing feature of popular attitudes is that distrust of national 
MPs is substantially higher. Only 22 percent of Portuguese 
and 27 percent of citizens of other member states trust their 
national Parliament.6 
6. See Eurobarometer 76, autumn, 2011, questions A14.1, A10.7.
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POLICY OUTPUTS
EU priorities. European Union treaties identify three 
‘pillars’ of policy. The first concerns the economy and its 
social consequences. The 1986 Single Europe Act enables the 
EU to adopt policies with a major influence on the econo-
mies of both large and small states. For the second pillar, 
Foreign & Security Policy, size matters when military capa-
bilities are relevant; even more important is agreement on 
actions--and this is often lacking. The third EU pillar, Justice 
and Home Affairs, addresses issues such as the movement of 
people across the borders of member states and from further 
afield; these concerns are more likely to reflect a country’s 
economic and geopolitical influence than its size. 
To carry out its policy commitments, the European 
Commission is divided into three dozen Directorates 
grouped under 27 Commissioners, one from each member 
state. These are: 
* *Economy. Agriculture and Rural Development. 
Competition. Consumer Protection. Economic and 
Monetary Affairs. Employment, Social Affairs and 
Equal Opportunities. Energy. Enterprise and Industry. 
Environment. Fisheries and Maritime Affairs. 
Information Society and Media. Internal Market and 
Services. Regional Policy. Science and Research. Taxation 
and Customs Union. Trade. Transport. 
* *Foreign & Security. Development and Humanitarian 
Aid. Enlargement. External Relations and European 
Neighbourhood Policy. 
* *Justice & Home Affairs. Education, Training, Culture 
and Youth. Health. Justice, Freedom and Security. 
Multilingualism.
* *Administration of the EU. Administrative Affairs, 
Audit and Fraud. Financial Programming and Budget. 
Institutional Relations and Communications Strategy. 
Presidency. 
IV
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Consistent with its origins as the European Economic 
Community, the economy remains by far the primary 
concern of the Commission’s policymakers. This priority is 
matched by Portugal’s Office of Permanent Representative; a 
big majority of its counsellors monitor a variety of economic 
issues. The challenge of managing the administration of the 
EU is indicated by the number of Directorates seeing to such 
things as budgeting, public relations, and preventing fraud. 
Whereas the founders of the EU gave priority to prevent-
ing war as well as to economic reconstruction, the commit-
ment and capacity of EU institutions to foreign and security 
issues is limited. 
The emphasis that the EU gives to economic affairs exempli-
fies Europe’s multi-level government, for management of the 
economy is a shared responsibility of national governments 
and EU institutions. The Eurobarometer survey asks people 
whether they think decisions about such major economic 
concerns as tackling unemployment should be made by 
their national government or jointly with the European 
Union. Across the EU, 58 percent want their national 
government to be in charge of unemployment as against 
39 percent favouring joint policymaking with the EU. 
However, in Portugal the position is reversed: 54 percent 
want joint action with the EU on unemployment against 40 
percent favouring national action. In addition, 43 percent of 
Portuguese would welcome EU involvement with national 
taxation as against 28 percent of all Europeans; 45 percent 
would welcome EU involvement with national pensions as 
against 24 percent of Europeans; and 57 percent endorse 
the EU being jointly responsible for managing the country’s 
public debt as against 44 percent of all Europeans.7 
Comparing the EU’s policy priorities with national priori-
ties highlights big differences between the two levels of 
government. Whatever their population, national govern-
ments spend most of their money on pensions, health care 
and education. By contrast, the biggest pension expendi-
ture of the EU is on pensions to its own retirees; the EU has 
little involvement with health; and its education policies 
7. . Eurobarometer 76, autumn 2011, question A20. 
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principally affect universities and research institutes. Many 
foreign policy issues of concern to EU institutions, such 
as representing Europe in international meetings on other 
continents, are of little concern to small states. There is no 
expectation in Brussels that Portugal will be a leader in such 
areas as the EU’s policy toward China or responses to crises 
such as the Arab spring. Insofar as the EU’s influence on 
such international events is very limited, this is no partic-
ular loss to small states. When issues of low Portuguese 
priority come before the Council, the government can gain 
goodwill by going along with other countries on issues that 
are their priorities. It can also engage in logrolling, trading 
support with other countries on unrelated policies. 
There are very few policies that are exclusively national. 
Even issues that are of little concern to the vast majority 
of member states can nonetheless involve more than one 
country, for example, Northern Ireland raises issues affect-
ing both the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. 
A country’s history, geography or resources may give it a 
distinctive interest in a given issue. For example, Portugal 
can claim to be a leading voice on issues concerning the EU’s 
relations with Brazil and its past engagement with colonies in 
Africa gives it knowledge that most EU member states lack. 
Laws and regulations the chief EU resource. National 
governments have three major resources--laws, money and 
public employees. The way in which these resources are 
combined varies between policies. For example, the regu-
lation of business tends to be law-intensive; paying social 
security benefits is money-intensive; and health and educa-
tion are both labour and money intensive. The EU’s combi-
nation and use of resources is very different from national 
governments. 
Law is the chief resource of the European Union and unlike 
money there is no limit on the amount of legislation it can 
adopt annually. While the great majority of measures are 
of little significance, cumulatively they add up to tens of 
thousands of pages of regulations, directives and decisions. 
Laws apply to all member states and citizens, whatever their 
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population, and they affect economic enterprises social 
groups and individuals without regard to their nationality.
The chief constraint on the output of EU legislation is the 
need to get approval from the institutions that constitute 
the EU’s compound polity. Formally, laws enacted by the 
European Parliament and approved by the Council are 
the EU’s equivalent of a national Act of Parliament. Before 
they can be approved there is a process of consultation 
with affected interest groups at the national and European 
level, with PERMREP Offices and with relevant MEPs and 
European Parliament committees. The President of the 
European Commission or Council can make statements 
about world problems, for example, the need for peace in the 
Middle East, or the desirability of achieving greater social 
cohesion in 2020. However, when the resources to put inten-
tions into effect are lacking, such statements remain exhor-
tations without material effect. 
The revenue of the European Union is little more than 1 
percent of the total Gross Domestic Product of member 
states. However, the money it collects annually from 
member states is in total more than the income of the EU’s 
ten smaller states and about three-quarters of the Gross 
Domestic Product of Portugal. EU revenue comes principally 
from member states according to an ability-to-pay formula 
that is levied on Gross National Income and augmented by 
a percentage of each country’s Value Added Tax. The result 
is that the per capita contribution of Portugal to the EU 
budget is bigger than that of poor East European countries 
but much less than that of prosperous small countries such 
as Sweden. In 2009 Portugal contributed euro 1.8bn to the 
EU, about 1 percent of its Gross Domestic Product. 
Two sets of entitlement policies account for more than five-
sixths of EU expenditure: cash payments for agriculture and 
rural development and the promotion of economic growth 
and employment. A country’s claim to these sums reflects 
its economic structure, for example, economic problems 
arising from an uncompetitive labour force or high regional 
unemployment due to declining industries and whether 
agriculture is relatively important. National governments 
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must make their case for getting more money spent in their 
country by producing evidence of entitlements or by seek-
ing to alter EU entitlement formulas in ways that will enable 
their country to benefit.
Figure 4.1 How the EU budget affecrs Member States
*Because of very small population and many EU offices, Luxembourg’s net 
benefit is nominally €2,5303. 
Source: European Commission, 2010. For further details, see Appendix 
Table 1.
Portugal claimed more than euro 4.3bn from the EU budget 
in 2010; euro3.05bn was received for economic growth and 
employment policies and euro1.25bn for agriculture and 
rural development. Portugal was one of the biggest benefi-
ciaries of economic development funds, receiving more EU 
money than better off large states such as Britain or France. 
Whether a country is a 
net beneficiary of the 
EU budget depends on 
its economic and social 
structure rather than its 
population
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Moreover, Spain, with more than four times the popula-
tion of Portugal, received only twice as much for economic 
development.
Whether a country is a net beneficiary of the EU budget 
depends on its economic and social structure rather than its 
population. Belgium and Luxembourg are big beneficiaries 
because EU institutions are one of their major industries! 
Poland is the biggest net beneficiary of EU funding because 
it is both populous and relatively poor. Portugal ranks fifth 
in the total amount of money it receives, behind much Spain, 
Poland, Greece and Hungary. When population is taken 
into account, Portugal ranks seventh in per capita benefits, 
behind four former Communist countries plus Greece and 
Luxembourg. 
Public employees are a major resource of member states, 
because most major national programmes are labour-inten-
sive. However, employees are a minor EU resource because 
laws are carried out by national governments and money it 
spends is administered by employees of member states. The 
EU has only 26,000 employees, less than public employment 
in a medium-size European city and less than 1 percent of 
the labour force of Portugal. The biggest category of EU 
employees consists of bureaucrats in the literal sense, offi-
cials concerned with making and administering laws and 
regulations in accord with procedures laid down in EU 
Treaties and laws.
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DEVELOPING SMARTER POWER
The size of a country is a given; in the European Union 
Portugal is and will remain a medium-size state. It is larger 
than many small states but in the shadow of a few states big 
in population and in economic displacement. Portugal has 
had the advantage of a quarter of a century of membership 
to learn how the EU works, whereas the 12 new member 
states joining since 2004 have not. However, once all these 
new members learn to make full use of the EU system, then 
Portugal will face increasing competition to be noticed in 
the EU policymaking process--and further enlargement 
will increase the number of small states. Instead of being 
content with the country’s current level of smart power, it 
should think in terms of developing smarter power. 
 What the Portuguese government can do. While the rules 
governing the EU policy process are fixed, the Portuguese 
government has the freedom to organise its activities within 
the process. To influence policies, national officials must act 
smartly, that is, make their case at the right time, which is 
early in the decision process, and to the right people, that is, 
other countries with similar interests and views. To take a 
position without regard for how much or how little support 
it will attract from others invites being marginalised or 
ignored in Council deliberations. 
A single small state can only be effective if it develops a 
common position in alliance with representatives of other 
states, both large and small. When Naurin and Lindahl 
(2010: Table 4.1 ) asked hundreds of participants in Working 
Groups reviewing policy which country they most often 
cooperated with to develop common positions, three large 
states--Britain, France and Germany--came top. Big size is 
not sufficient to be a central figure in policy alliances, for 
Italy came well down the list, because of difficulties in its 
government. Smallness is not necessarily a liability. Three 
small countries, Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark, 
are frequently consulted as allies, because of the skills of 
their officials in building alliances for policies that will 
secure Council endorsement. Some small states have 
common borders and history that encourage alliances. The 
V
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three Nordic countries--Denmark, Sweden and Finland-
-normally meet as a group before each European Council 
meeting and Benelux countries are in frequent contact too. 
The three Baltic states have frequent consultations on a 
range of policy issues, such as foreign and security policy. 
The four Visegrad states--the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Slovakia and Poland--began working together when seeking 
admission to the EU. 
Co-operation is not often sought with Portugal. In inter-
views conducted by Naurin and Lindahl prior to EU 
enlargement, it was placed twelfth out of fifteen states, below 
those comparable in size or smaller, such as Denmark, 
Finland, Sweden and Austria. When the study was repeated 
after the 2004 enlargement, Portugal was placed eighteenth 
out of twenty-five. Portugal was not only below bigger and 
older member states but also below Poland, a leader among 
enlargement countries because of its size; the three Baltic 
states; and the four Visegrad states. When networks are 
formed, Portugal is most likely to turn to Spain in order to 
benefit from the links that Spain has with the biggest states. 
By contrast, Ireland does not depend on its historic partner, 
Britain, but builds alliances with a variety of member states 
as appropriate to the issue. For example, Ireland has allied 
with less prosperous countries on cohesion policy and with 
France on agriculture. 
Portugal is more likely to be sought as a partner by other 
Mediterranean countries (Naurin and Lindahl, 2010: 76). 
While the three biggest countries, France, Italy and Spain, 
are most important, other Mediterranean states are then 
more likely to cooperate with Portugal than with a big 
majority of other EU member states. While these links are 
natural asset, they are under pressure, since the 
Mediterranean countries with which Portugal can ally are a 
declining proportion of EU member states and before the 
eurozone crisis it had fewer EU links with the EU’s largest 
state, Germany, or with ten post-Communist countries. 
Thus, Portugal could benefit by actively seeking to increase its 
ties with Northern Europe and with Eastern Europe. 
Party choices of MEPs. The use of the list system in select-
ing MEPs enables parties to determine which candidates 
Portugal could benefit 
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are almost certain of being elected because they are high on 
the party list and which have little or no hope of election. 
The choice of who is high on the list is invariably subject to 
personal and internal party politics. It also has consequences 
for the quality of representatives that a party returns to the 
European Parliament. 
Because MEPs are links between the Portuguese elector-
ate and the EU policy process, to act smartly they need to 
understand both the national politics of Portugal and the 
multi-national politics of Brussels. MEPs who have served 
as members of their national parliament are at an advantage. 
Portuguese parties give a high place on their list to party 
members already well integrated in the national political 
system. Nearly three-fifths of Portuguese MEPs returned in 
2009 have been members of the national parliament (Figure 
5.1) By contrast, little more than one-third of all MEPs have 
sat in national parliament and in Germany only 13 percent. 
In addition, more than one-third of Portuguese MEPs have 
been ministers in the national government; this provides 
the added experience of sitting in the Council in Brussels as 
well as in the national Cabinet. This is more than double the 
overall EU pattern. Whatever the party in power in Lisbon 
and the strength of Party Groups in Brussels, there are many 
MEPs qualified to discuss EU policies in Lisbon. 
To discuss policy in the cosmopolitan environment of the 
European Parliament requires fluency in the EP’s two work-
ing languages, English and French, both foreign languages 
for Portuguese. Given the extent to which a university 
education now requires reading texts in an international 
scientific language, graduates have some familiarity with at 
least one foreign language. All but one of Portugal’s MEPs is 
a graduate and several have PhDs or have studied in prestig-
ious institutions in the United States or France. 
It takes a significant part of an MEP’s initial term of office to 
come to grips with how the EP system works and how it 
relates to the European Commission and Council. It also 
takes time to identify common interests and network with 
MEPs from other countries who share common interests. 
An MEP who serves more than one term will have much 
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more potential for influence than a fledgling MEP. Eight 
Portuguese representatives have been MEPs for more than 
one term and several have had significant experience in 
other posts in Brussels, for example, as a principal advisor to 
a department of the Commission or as a Portuguese diplo-
mat there. At the start of the Parliament elected in 2009, 
about half of Portugal’s MEPs were already familiar with its 
institutions.
Figure 5.1 National Experience of Portuguese MEPs in comparison
Source: Richard Corbett, F. Jacobs and M. Shackleton, The European 
Parliament (8th edition, 2011), 56.
The turnover of Portuguese MEPs from one election to the 
next is very high: 15 of the 22 elected in 2009 had not served 
in the previous Parliament. Most turnover was due to the 
voluntary departure of MEPs rather than electoral defeat. 
For example, nine of the ten MEPs that the Social Democratic 
and the Popular Party returned were newcomers. Among 
the shrunken Socialist Party representation, three of its 
seven MEPs were newcomers. While the turnover of MEPs 
has always been around half its total membership, the two-
thirds turnover of Portuguese MEPs is well above the 
European average (cf. Corbett et al., 2011: 51). It places the 
country at a disadvantage, because Portugal does not have 
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the ‘surplus’ MEPs of large countries. The need for MEPs to 
be fully effective will become more important as future 
enlargement leads to the reduction in Portugal’s current 
allocation of 22 MEPs.8 Portugal’s MEPs would collectively 
wield smarter power if Portuguese parties would nominate 
candidates who, subject to election outcomes, were prepared 
to spend two terms in the EP rather than leaving soon after 
mastering the work there. 
Understanding and supportive citizens. All democrati-
cally elected governments need the backing of their citi-
zens for what they do. The increasing Europeanization of 
policy requires popular understanding of what national 
governments do in Brussels as well as in their national capi-
tal. Understanding and support is even more important for 
eurozone countries such as Portugal, which finds itself on the 
receiving end of policies imposing visible costs as the price of 
providing funds to overcome Portugal’s financial crisis. 
When the autumn, 2011 Eurobarometer asked Portuguese 
whether they think they understand how the EU works, 37 
percent replied positively, while 58 percent said they had no 
understanding and the remainder were don’t knows. A lack 
of political understanding does not prevent people from 
having opinions. For example, 60 percent of Portuguese 
believe that the European Union usually does not take the 
country’s interest into account and 43 percent are not satis-
fied with the way in which democracy is working in the 
European Union. 9 
Ignorance or indifference is more likely to be the median 
popular view of EU policies than outright disagreement. The 
two are combined in answer to a Eurobarometer question 
about whether Portuguese consider that EU membership 
offers good value for money.10 Notwithstanding Portugal 
8. The admission of Croatia to the EU will give it a claim to seats that will 
have to be subtracted from medium size states, of which Portugal is 
one. A harbinger of vulnerability is that when the EP took advantage 
of transitional clauses in the Lisbon Treaty to add 18 seats to the 736 
MEPs elected in 2009, none was allocated to Portugal. 
9. Eurobarometer 76, autumn, 2011, questions A19a.1, A219a.2, A18b.
10. Eurobarometer 75, spring 2011, question D3.
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being one of the biggest beneficiaries of EU funding (Figure 
4.1), 40 percent said they thought the EU offers poor value, 
as against 28 percent considering that membership offered 
good value to Portuguese. The median group, 32 percent, 
were honestly indifferent, saying they had no opinion. Since 
the government of Portugal is now obligated to impose 
substantial costs on citizens as a consequence of the euro-
zone crisis, it needs the support of its citizen for policies that 
reflect the effects of decisions taken in Brussels, Frankfurt 
am Main, and further afield. The first step in gaining popu-
lar support for difficult economic decisions of government is 
to increase understanding of the need for effective action in a 
situation in which all choices have immediate and visible costs.
Developing smarter power is a team effort; it cannot be 
imposed by a single decision or Act of Parliament. Smart 
power requires collective effort by cadres of Portuguese who 
are familiar with how policies are formulated in Brussels 
in order to build wider and stronger networks there. It also 
requires care by national party officials deciding who to 
nominate for winning places on the lists of candidates nomi-
nated for the European Parliament. In an era in which many 
policies are ‘Euromestic’, involving decisions in Lisbon and 
Brussels, developing popular understanding requires the 
sustained effort of political leaders to explain what happens 
when the political preferences of 10 million Portuguese are 
combined with those of 500 million Europeans. 
Because of limited population, small countries do not have 
the financial or human resources to staff offices in Brussels 
on the scale of the Federal Republic of Germany and travel 
to and from Lisbon takes significantly longer than from 
Paris or Amsterdam. The circulation of individuals in and 
out of EU-related jobs increases the total pool of people with 
an understanding of both national and European levels 
of governance and diffuses this knowledge more widely 
in society. The larger the cadre of people who can exercise 
smart power on Portugal’s behalf at both the national and 
European levels, the more effective actions are likely to be in 
today’s multi-level European political system.
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A NOTE ON READING AND SOURCES
There is an enormous literature about the European Union. The contemporary 
institutions of the EU are covered clearly and systematically in textbook fashion by 
Nugent (2010), which also provides a useful bibliography and chronology. Dinan 
(2010) provides a single-volume history of the European Union from its origins in 
the European Coal & Steel Community. On the Lisbon Treaty’s effect on the EU, see 
Piris (2010). The work of the European Council and Council of Ministers is analyzed 
in Naurin and Wallace (2010) and of the Commission in Spence and Edwards (2006). 
Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton (2011) provide a detailed account of the workings 
of the European Parliament. Policymaking in the EU is covered in systemic and 
specific fields in Wallace, Pollack and Young (2010). The books by Panke (2010) 
and Steinmetz and Wivel (2010) focus specially on the position of small European 
countries within the EU and in international politics. Ladrech (2009) analyzes the 
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Hoyland (2011) provide a more quantitative approach. Palgrave Macmillan publishes 
the largest list of books on specific institutions of the EU (see www.palgrave.com). 
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offering a variety of perspectives on current issues of policy.
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